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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

<~EORGE

L. BELL, et al,
Plain tiffs-Respmul ent",

vs.

!

, Case No.

I

BUD FA VERO and :MAURICE
.)
RICHARDS,
Defendants-Appellants. ;

10709

BRIEF OF A.PPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF.CASE
The appellants, Bud Favero and Maurice Richards,
two of three elected Commissioners of Weber County,
appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Weber
County, the Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge of the
First District, sitting at request without jury, awarding respondent judgment against each defendant in
the sum of Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Dollars,
fiftr eents, ($777.50), One Thousand Five Hundred
l

Fifty Five ($1,555.00) Dollars in total, plus sorr
costs, for allegedly making an ultra vires appropratir,,
of public funds in violation of 17-5-13, Utah Code At
notated, 1953.

DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
On March l, 1966, George L. Bell, a taxpayerani
resident of Weber County, filed a complaint in th
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, agairu1
Bud Favero and Maurice Richards, Weber Coun~
Commissioners. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant·
had improperly and illegally appropriated certaill
public funds for football admission tickets for privalt
individuals. A further allegation was contained in lli
complaint that the actions of the defendants were dom
fraudulently. The plaintiff sought recovery of $600.~~
allegedly appropriated by the defendants and a $500.~~
forfeiture under the provisions of 17-5-13, Utah Coat
Annotated, 1953. A motion to strike was filed anu
denied and an answer duly entered by the defendants.
Discovery was perfected by both parties and the matter
tried to the Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judgr
of the First Judicial District, sitting upon request
Subsequent to the receipt of the evidence, Judge Jone·
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against tne
defendants, finding however, that in the alleged appro·
priation was not fraudulently made.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants submit the decision of the trial court
should be reversed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are relatively undisputed. Mr. Gary
Crompton, the athletic business manager of Weber
State College, testified that he approached the Weber
County Commissioners for the purpose of getting them
to purchase an ad in the football programs of 'V eber
State College (Tr. 6). He indicated that the Commissioners stated that they didn't want to put an ad
in the programs even though it had been the general
practice in the past, but that they indicated they wanted
to help the college (Tr. 7). They felt that putting an
ad in a football program was political (Tr. 7). There
were several meetings held between Mr. Crompton
and one or more of the Commissioners and as an end
result the county purchased 50 season, reserved tickets
at 'Veber State College football games for the sum
of $600.00 (Tr. 8). Mr. Crompton testified that he was
under the impression that the Commissioners wanted
to help the school more than they had done in the past
(Tr. 11). Crompton told the Commissioners that there
were approximately three ways that they could help.
The first way was by placing an ad in the football
programs ; the second, by making a direct scholarship
to the college; or third, by purchasing football tickets
and distributing them to county employees in an effort

3

to get them to attend the football games as a ,'
and encourage interest in the Weber State
athletic program (Tr. 11, Tr. 13-14). Crompton 1,:
the Commissioners that he preferred the purchas~
the tickets because he felt it would do more to deyt[
the Weber State College athletic program (Tr. Ii

c:r

Mr. Crompton testified that prior to the rn
football season the college had only sold approximate
150 reserved season tickets in 1964 out of 1,170 rn
able. He stated that the money acquired through tic1
purchases went to the same fund as that used for ath!et
scholarships for the Weber State College Athletic D,
partment (Tr. 15). He said that the 1965 season, tl
season for which the Weber County Commissionersk
purchased the tickets, a 200 % increase in attendan1·
resulted (Tr. 16).
Mr. Crompton also testified that payment for Iv
tickets was made approximately three weeks after!
had delivered the tickets and that payment was hr
$600.00 check. He indicated that the cashier at Wek
State College had received the check and a voucfli:
on which noted the payment was for a scholarship an:
he advised the cashier that it should be treated as,
ticket purchase (Tr. 10). Mr. Thomas H. Jacksor
the cashier of Weber State College, testified that~·
credited the $600.00 payment towards ticket sales.
Commissioner Elmer Carver, a 'Veber Count:
. ·
Comm1ss1oner,
who was not sue d as a part Y defendan
testified that he recalled a meeting in which Mr. CroJJI[
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ton was present and in which there was discussion about
purchasing football tickets. He indicated, however,
he did not approve the purchase, and subsequently,
\\'hen it was called to his attention, he scanned the minutes of the formal meetings and was unable to find
any formal approval. He stated that although there
was no budget request made for the tickets as part of
the annual budget it was not uncommon to make expenditures for items not budgeted. He testified that
the daim for the purchase of the tickets was handled
•
in the usual and routme
way (Tr. 30), and ackow!edged that a lot of claims against the County Treasurer
were paid other than at regular meetings and that
expenditures could be authorized on the signature
of one commissioner unless there was some question
I expen d'1ture an d t hen two approva1s were
about tie
requested (Tr. 29). He stated the reason that he did
not approve the claim was because he was not familiar
with it, but he didn't question it (Tr. 32).
Donna Adam, an employee of the 'Veber County
Clerk, who took the regular minutes of the Commissioners' meetings, testified that according to the minute~
Mr. Crompton appeared before the Commission on
the 21st of August, 1965, at which time there was discussion relating to the Commissioners putting an ad
in the Weber State College football program and there
was also discussion relative to obtaining football tickets
for eounty employees at a group rate. She testified
that she could remember that there was discussion about
helping the eollege and that the claim for the football
5

tickets was approved on October 14, 1965, and int],'
usual routine manner (Tr. 39-42).
Mr. Dee Wilcox, the 'iV eber County Audito:
called and testified that generally the purchasing ordt!
procedure is that the purchasing procedure for item,
the county needs is that a purchase order is made ur
and sent to his office to determine whether or not the;
is sufficient funds in the budget to cover the expen~
ture. He would normally indicate that there was suff:·
cient money and the purchase order would go back Ir.
the purchasing department where the purchase ord11
was required to be approved by one of the Commb·
sioners if it was in excess of $100.00. He indicated th~· 1
the appropriation for the football tickets was approve:!
by Commissioners Favero and Richards (Tr. 46). Hr!
indicated that the claim stated that it was "Scholarshir;
for Weber Athletic Department" (Tr. 46). He irnli·
cated that the warrant was dated October 13, and tk
purchase order September 20. He further testifier!
that subsequent to the time that he found out that fool
ball tickets he received had been purchased with tllii
$600.00 funds, he paid back the value of the ticke\i'
he received as did another individual in his departmen1
(Tr. 53-54). The amount paid back totaled $45.00.
Mr. Warren Drury, an employee in the Wek
County Shops, who serves on the Board of the Webei
County Employees' Association, indicated that he rr
ceived tickets from Mr. Al Covieo (Tr. 57). He stat~;
he was told to go to the football games and join ail'
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assoeiate with the other employees (Tr. 58). He stated
that he hadn't been before at least for several years
and as a result of receiving the tickets he purchased
other tickets and then intended to buy more next year.
He further testified that at one point plaintiff himself
wanted to obtain some of the tickets (Tr. 58-59).
Mr. B. M. Richards, a deputy sheriff who also
serves as a non-paid member of the \Veber County
Health Board, testified that he received several tickets
and he gave some to a District Judge and to employees of the County Hospital ('l'r. 60-61). He
received the tickets from Mr. Covieo and he stated that
Covieo indicated that he was trying to give the tickets
to people who hadn't attended before and to scatter
them among the employees of the county (Tr. 61) .
He stated that as a result of the tickets given him,
he was "sold" on Weber State College football and
intended to buy a season ticket (Tr. 62).
Dr. Rex M. Alvord, a physician, testified that he
received four tickets and that he used some and gave
some away. He indicated the tickets had been given to
him by the President of the County Industrial Bureau.
The answers to interrogatories proposed by the
plaintiff were published and received by the court.
Interrogatory 17 showed that most of the persons receiving tickets were employed in some positions in the
county (R. 5).
In addition Dr. Alvord testified that the attendaner at football games had increased by many thou-

7

sand and that he was especially impressed with tl
economic value the ticket purchase had for the corul
munity (Tr. 65-67). Also, Mr. Lowell H. A!v01,.
testified that he was employed at Hill Air Force Ba1f
was a member and chairman of the Weber Counli
Health Board. He received tickets to the Weber Stat,
College football games, distributed by Mr. Covieo (Tr
70). He testified that he was present when all tk
Commissioners discussed the tickets and that he under
stood that it was their intention that unsalaried em
ployees be given some of the benefit by the distributior
of the tickets (Tr. 71).
Maurice Richards, an appellant and Weber Coun~,
Commissioner, testified that Mr. Covieo, a general em·I
ployee and inspector for 'Veber County, had beer:
designated to handle the relationships with Mr. Crom~
ton (Tr. 73). He stated that Crompton wanted to comi
to the Commission and upon presenting his ideas 11
the Commission, it appeared that he wanted the Com
missioners to take an ad in the program. He was advisea
by the Commissioners that they did not desire to tak
an ad because they considered it political (Tr. 74i
He stated that Mr. Crompton then mentioned obtainini.
tickets and selling them to County employees, but tha1.
this idea was rejected as involving too much difficuln
(Tr. 75). Crompton stated that the College need~
help and he was asking the Commission to help theii
I
program. Commissioner Richards testified at severa,
meetings the question of providing a scholarship for
between $500 and $700 to the college was discusseJ
1

1

8

I He stated that he discussed, on the street, with Mr.
I Crompton the possibility of a $600.00 scholarship being
u
,,
giren directly to the school. Mr. Crompton told Rich1
f
ards that he ,,·as interested in building up the athletic
!i fund and that a direct scholarship would not have tha1
effect (Tr. 76). He listed the ways the Commissioners
could help the College and suggested the idea of purchasing tickets as a means of developing the athletic
program (Tr. 76). Subsequent to the meeting on the
street, two of the Commissioners told Crompton that
they would go forward with the ticket purchase of
$600.00. This was on or about the 17th or 18th of
~' September. Richards said he or Mr. Favero told Mr.
Covieo to make out a requisition for $600.00 and that
l·i
as a result a purchase order was prepared, signed and
tr!
submitted as a proper claim (Tr. 77). 'Vhen the tickets
~· first arrived, they were scattered throughout the stam
dium and they were sent back in order to get seats
together (Tr. 78) . Commissioner Richards said it was
n·
his intent to aid the athletic department and that Mr.
ea
Ki Crompton had been pushing the end result of getting
money into the athletic fund and selling tickets in order
·i
ii. to get people out to support 'Veber State College foot·
at
ball (Tr. 78-79). He also stated it was Mr. Covieo's
hi job to get out the crowds and to distribute the tickets
to non-paid board members, hospital confinees, county
employees and to generally use his own discretion. He
'lated that it was not their intention to give tickets
·a1
to those who normally would have gone, and that
01
although this had occurred on one instance when a
I,,

1

1
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ticket had been given at the front gate to an individ11J
who had intended to go to the game, it was suii'
sequently corrected (Tr. 79-81). Richards testifie,J
that it was Commission policy that any expenditur,
over $100.00 required one Commissioner's approrai
unless there was some question about it and then
required two or three Commissioners' signatures (Tr
82). He stated that most expenditures are not approveo
at regular meetings. Richards stated that at the tu11t
Covieo was directed to make up the voucher, there wen
no specific instructions given to him as to what to put
on the requisition and that there was no intention tr,
make the requisition secret. The idea was to generatr
spirit and enthusiasm within a block of people, pri·
marily county employees and affiliates, and to heli I
Weber State College (Tr. 88) . The primary purpose
was to help the college (Tr. 88). Richards testified that
Commissioner Favero signed Richards' name to tne
requisition by stamping it on the requisition and that
this was authorized by him (Tr. 91).
:
1

Donna Adam, the employee of the County Clerk
testified as to a minute entry which would allow an!
Commissioner to approve an expenditure in an amount
over $100.00, but two out of three was required if the
1
expenditure was questioned in any manner (Tr. 93).
Al Covieo testified that he was an inspector ana
apparently a general administrator for the Count)
Commission (Tr. 94). He stated that Mr. Cromp:01:,
appeared on several occasions before the Commisswn

10

1

tn solieit help for the 'Veber State College athletic
program. He stated that he was directed to make out
~i $G00.00 purchase order to Weber College, that h2
rew1ested a secretary, Lorna Boam, to make out the
requisition. He said he knew it was for football tickets
and that he couldn't remember telling her what to
put on the requisition, but that he and Crompton were
talking arnl that she apparently absorbed the conversation between the two and placed the statement relating to athletic scholarship on the requisition (Tr. 95).
He stated that no one told her to put the purpose of
the requisition as being for scholarships (Tr. 96). He
indicated that the purpose of the purchase of the tickets
as he understood it was "to prime the pump" for Weber
State College and to distribute the tickets throughout
the building. He said that it was suggested that he distribute them first to unpaid board members, county
employees, individuals in hospitals and similar persons
(Tr. 97). He said he kept a record of who received
the tickets and who attended of every game, but did
not have the records at time of trial since the season was
om (Tr. 97). He said he would distribute some of the
tickets to the elected department heads, and that some
would pick up the tickets in his office and that generally
he was "running around" to distribute the tickets (Tr.
98). He indicated that he had never gone to 'Veber
State College football games before the ticket purchase
h11t that he went at the time and generally had a good
time. He did not use any of the tickets himself. He
further indicated that approximately 35% to 40% of
11

the tickets had not actually been used by the peroni.
to whom they were distributed to or that the ticke:.'
were not distributed into the hands of persons who J
use them (Tr. 102).
,
11

Lorna Boam, secretary of the Weber County Com
mission, testified that she wrote up the ticket purcha
requisition and that neither of the County Commission
ers instructed her how to fill it out. She stated tha:
either Mr. Covieo or Mr. Compton gave her infor!ll1.
tion as to what to put on the requisition (Tr. 104-lOoi.
1

Commissioner Bud Favero testified that he recallei
when Mr. Covieo and ~Ir. Compton came into the com
mission meeting and requested help for the Colleg1
(Tr. 107). He said that Crompton originally soughtar'
ad from the Commissioners and that this was turneu
down. He said this was computed on the basis of $70.~11
for the ad for 9 to 10 games which would be approxi·
mately $700.00 (Tr. 108). He indicated that first then
was consideration given to a direct scholarship n:
$600.00 and that finally Crompton talked them inl
taking tickets (Tr. 109). He stated that subsequem
to the determination being made, Mr. Covieo was toi~
to make out a requisition and that he did not tell theu
what to put on the requisition (Tr. 110-111). H11
stated there was no intent to hide anything in maki11~
up the requisition (Tr. 114). He considered the pa)
ment to be for a scholarship and the tickets a donatin'
to the Weber County Commission (Tr. 115). He fe\
the tickets had been given back to 'V eber County '''
1

12

onkr to develop good will (Tr. 115). He said that in,tructio11s were given to Covieo to distribute the tickets
g·enerally to unpaid board members and various other
county. officials (Tr. 114). He stated that some counb.·
unployees were poor and that this provided a means
to assist them to attend a game which they othenvise
1rn11ltl1d have the opportunity (Tr. 116). He stated
that their sole intention was to help '\Veber State College and that the Commission had contributed on other
occasion~ to .±-H clubs and other activities of public
import. lt further appeared in the record that the Commission hall made a donation to a 'Veber Countv proJ· rl'l known as "All Faces 'Vest" Tr. 34). 1\Ir. Favero
said that his 1:mrpose in taking the tickets ·was:
~

e~
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That instead of them taking that thousand
dollars and doing what I sometimes think they
do with it, to go out and give it to the people and
let them fill them stands and let them come and
see what a beautiful thing it is, that they actually
can't afford to. It would be better for the community. It would grow. Maybe they would save
from year to year to be able to go to this the next
year. All this is stimulating business just like
we try to do day in and day out with the Industrial Bureau. Stimulate the mind that we got
something here greater than just what we think
we h:ffe got, let people talk about. That's building industry, that's building our county. (Tr.
118-119).
Suh'>equent to the presentation of the evidence the
triR! <'()urt indicated that he felt there had been a mishke i11 judgment and the action of the 'Veher County
13

Commissioners, the appellants herein, was ultra 1.irt, ·
He stated that the court concluded as a matter of Jal'.
that counties do not have statutory power to construr1. ·
"Universities" and "build football fields or Cniwr
sities" and that that being so, that no power to apprr•
priate funds to the Weber State College (Tr. I21i :
The court felt th~re was a mistaken judgment b111
that it was an honest mistake (Tr. 122), and the motin
of the Commissioners was not questioned ,Tr. 1221
The court stated:
1

The court will state that a reading of tl1t
Commissioners' testimony convinces the cour'.
that they, the County Commissioners, belirn1
they had a right to make the purchases enume·:
rated and charge them to the county, and that!
they did these things through no dishonest mo·,
tives. They were simply mistaken as to the law
The court further stated (Tr. 123):

All right, the plaintiff prevails as to the fir~I
three paragraphs of the complaint. The plaintiff,
fails as to the paragraph four and five oft.he
complaint, and that portion is dismissed w1t!1
prejudice.
And (Tr. 122):

But the court finds that there was no frauil.
no wilfull criminality, no corrupt or venal act·
on the part of these County Commissioners, a~rl
expressly exonerates them from any evil m?tn·i
by reason of the concession made by pla1nt1tl
in its closing arguments.

14

And the court-I don't know how we're going
to do this. I want findings made at length on
this subject, that this is merely a mistake in
judgment on the part of the presiding officers
of this county.
The appellants submit the trial court erred in the
construction of the legislative powers of County Commissions.

POINT I

1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE APPROPRIATION MADE BY
APPELLANTS 'VAS ILLEGAL.

The appellants submit there is no justification for
: the trial com·t's ruling when a fair examination of
the evidence and the legal powers of the appellants is
made and the growing social and political realization
of the extent of participation of government in community affairs is properly appraised.

!,

The evidence is quite undisputed and simply shows
that the appellants, while acting as Commissioners of
Weber County, appropriated the sum of $600.00 to
Weber State College and in exchange, therefore, received football tickets which were distributed to nonpai<l county employees and officials, some hospitalized
persons, and others in the community. The purpose
of the appropriation was to aid \Veber State College,
an educational institution in the county. The appropriation was aimed at developing community interest

15

in the athletic program at the college and "primiii:
the pump" in developing the economic, social, and re(.:
reational resources of the community. The trial couril
found the action ultra vires apparently on the theor;)
that because there was no express authority authorizinc
county appropriations for "the building of univer:i.!
ties and colleges" it had no authority "to make dorn.i
tions to football fields and athletic funds" (R. 121:'
The court also determined that there was "no fraua
no wilful criminality" (R. 122).

1

The respondent maintained its action below undt;
the provisions of 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, J9ji,1·
which provides:
:
!

"Whenever any board of county commission·\
ers shall without authority of law order an!I
money paid for any purpose and such moued
shall have been actually paid, or whenever an1:
other county officer has drawn any warrant in'
his own favor or in favor of any person without
being authorized thereto by the board of coun~ ·
commissioners or by law and the same shall bait'
been paid, the county attorney of such coun~·
shall institute suit in the name of the counfy
against such person or such officer and his offi·'
cial bondsman to recover the money so paid, a.nu
when the money has not been paid on such order,
or warrants, the county attorney of such count)·
upon receiving notice thereof shall com~enci
suit in the name of the county to restram tnt
payment of the same; no order of the ~oard
county commissioners shall be necessary ill order
to maintain either of such actions."
?
1

111

16

·

The trial court also imposed the statutory penalty
't(
under 17-5-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.( 1 ) Thus,
ur·I the rssential issue is whether the expenditure made by
0 ~! the appellants was in fact ultra vires.
Iii,

17-5-9, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, provides:

lfl,:

I

f,.!

"The board of county commissioners shall
have power to make and enforce such rules and
regulations for the goyernment of the board,
the preservation of order and the transaction of
business as may be proper."

ua

The 'Veber County Commission had required the
appnwal of one commissioner on an appropriation of
om $100.00, but if there was any question on the item
I lhe approval of two commissioners was required. In
I
on·'i the instant case the ap_eellants approved the appropria1m.·.:
lion, and, therefore, it must be viewed as being made
1e:i
im under proper procedure and authority unless it was
•;
ultra vires.
rn

dti
•j:JI

ou1

Counties are certainly units of government in the
aw' State of Utah and arms of State authority. 'Veber
n~1
County existed prior to statehood and counties, like
nti.»
ffi, other sub-divisions of goYernment, necessarily must
ma perform many functions for their citizens. Emery
der County ·n. Burresen, 14 Utah 328, 47 Pac. 91; State
n!~ '"Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061. 17-4-1, Utah
nCT
Code Aunotated, 1953, provides:

nh

1

tnt

"The several counties of the state as they now
exist and such other counties as may be here-

111

de1
!

ill The pt~priety of this action is canvassed in POINT II of this
brief.
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after organized are bodies corporate and polit1t
and as such have the powers specified in th].
title and such other powers as are necessaril'
implied."
.',
Thus, county powers, which may be exercised bi
the Commissioners, necessarily exceed those set out ;;
statute and include necessary and implied powers, Ji
4-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The Commissioner.
of a county exercise legislative as well as executin
authority and have, therefore, some of the substantial
discretion that the legislative power envisions. 20 C.J.S.,
Counties, Sec. 74, p. 834. Of course, they also exercist
quasi-judicial authority, Salt Lake County v. Clinton.
39 Utah 462, 117 Pac. 1075 (1911). There is a pre·
sumption that the expenditure of funds is for a proper
county purpose, and courts may not substitute their
discretion as to the wisdom of an expenditure for that
of the local official. Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Uta!;
476, 206 P .2d 153 ( 1949). It is submitted when thest
factors are weighed against the statutes, evidence and
precedents applicable in this case, the appellants are
not liable under 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, 195,1
The general powers of a county are set out in li- ·
4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and include:
" ( 3) To make such contracts and to purchase
and hold such personal property as may ~
necessary to the exercise of its powers.
( 4) To manage and dispose of its prop~rti
as the interests of its inhabitants may require.

lS

1

The interests of the inhabitants and the general
perfornia1ice of county purposes appear to be the other
limitations on the contracting and spending power of
counties. 17-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, deals
with a county's right to appropriate money and contains only one relevant limitation:
"No county shall in any manner give or lend
its credit to or in aid of any person or corporation, or appropriate money in aid of any private
enterprise."
From the above sections it may be concluded that
county expenditures must be for public purposes rather
than private, and the expenditure of funds or disposal
of property must be in the interest of its inhabitants.

In 20 C.J.S., Counties, Sec. 236, it is observed:
"A county board has no power to make appropriations for any purposes other than those
authorized by law. It must not violate constitutional and statutory limitations and prohibitions; and, in the absence of express statutory
authority to do so, it cannot appropriate county
funds for other than county purposes. It is unnecessary, however, that the entire public be
benefited from the object in aid of which such
funds are set apart, and, in determining whether
an appropriation is for a public purpose, the
public policy of the state as expressed in its legislative enactments is entitled to weighty consideration."
Thns. the expenditure in the instant case must at
least haYe been for a county purpose to be valid. As
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noted above, the needs of the inhabitants and the nect,
sary and implied functions of a county may determliit
whether it is a county purpose, subject to the limi
tation that the expenditure should not be for a privai'.
purpose. Certainly, at this juncture it is appare t
that the trial court too narrowly circumscribed tli :
powers of counties. Weber State College is a publir
institution, Title 53, Chapter 43, Utah Code Annotatea.
1953. It is located in Weber County and satisfih
multiple needs of the local citizenry, economic, social.
educational, recreational, et al. Therefore, it seene
axiomatic that an expenditure for Weber State Colleg1
is an expenditure for a county purpose.
11

17-5-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:

"The boards of county commissioners of tnt
respective counties within the state are author
ized and empowered to provide for the develo~·
ment of the county's mineral, water, man-power
industrial and other resources."
Thus, the Legislature has expressly recognized tl1t
obligation of the County Commissioners to endeavor In
develop county resources. Broad language was used O!
the Legislature thus evidencing an intent to allow greal
discretion to be used by County Commissioners in de·
termining by what means the resources of the couul.1
will be developed. It would be an absurd argument k
urge that Weber State College is not a resource 1>:
Weber County or an industry of that county. Comr·
quently, the Commissioners of Weber County werr
clearly empowered to expend county funds in promrr!
20

ing the college and the activities of the college. See
Laws of Utah, 1956, Ch. 32, Sec. 1, and especially the
Title of the Act. 17-5-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

expressly allows the "board of county commissioners"
to "expend county funds as are deemed advisable" to
carry out the development of resources in the county.
More directly, 11-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
allows counties to organize and conduct athletic contests and maintain "other forms of recreational activity
that may employ the leisure time of the people in a
constructive and wholesome manner.< 2 >
Several cases have found donations by local government organizations to schools within their boundaries to be proper expenditures.

In Southwestern Presb. University v. City of
Clarksville, 149 Tenn. 256, 259 S.\V. 550 (1924), the
rourt was concerned with whether municipal funds
could be used to support a non-profit, private, sectarian
school within the municipal liuits. The court found the
!'outribution of funds proper because "the city was
providing for a higher school education for its young
men than otherwise could be afforded." In the instant
case ~Ir. Favero felt the expenditure a donation, and
certainly the county's contribution would be providing
for participation in athletics of interest to the county
11hich otherwise might not have been afforded.
1

2) See also 17-31-1, Utah Code Annotated, 19:'>3, allowing the
llO'e of t:1c tax:ng power for the establisil!r.ent of a recreational or tourist bureau.
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A similar issue was before the court in Butler
Compton Junior College Dist., 77 Cal. App.2d ii,.
176 P .2d 417 ( 1947). In holding the expenditure 1
public funds against a taxpayer's claim of illegality tL
court observed:
"The education of t?e young is a public pur
pose of the greatest importance, fraught wili.
no less consequence than the purposes for wh1cl
the expenditure of public funds was appron,;
in O'Dea v. Cook. ... "
See also City College of New York v. Hylan, 20.j
App. D.,V. 372, 199 N.Y.S. 804.
The approval of the use of county funds for'
state medical college was acknowledged in Smith r.
Robertson, 41 S.E.2d 631 ( S.C. 1947).
In McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol.
Sec. 39.25, p. 69, it is observed:

Jj,

"Likewise, aid to a college, or to a publii
school, aid to charitable institutions, donation·
to a housing authority, and appropriations for
incorporated homes for friendless women or fm
industrial expositions, or to secure the locatw:
near the city of a state reform school to wlucl
it may send its youthful off enders, have bee
held proper."
11

In Bailey v. Van Dyke> 66 Utah 184, 240 Pat
454 ( 1925), the expendture of funds was approre·
where Weber County gave $250.00 to the Utah Stal
Agricultural College under contract for extensir,r
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rrrwes. The contention was made that the expenditure

1

ras not for a public purpose and that the statute
authorizing such services was, therefore, unconstitutional. This court found the expenditure to be for a
public purpose noting that it was "designed for the
public welfare., and provided "popular education for
the benefit of those not reached by schools and colleges."
1

In the instant case the expenditure of funds would

aid the athletic program of Weber State College including the athletic scholarship fund. This would enable
'20; persons to obtain education they otherwise may not
!iare been able to obtain. Further, by "priming the
pump" of community interest in the college and its
or :i
acti\'ities the growth of the college is assured. The
h i.
economy of the county is enhanced and industry attracted. Further, the aesthetic interests and recreational
pursuits of the citizens are stimulated and satisfied.
The action of the appellants was solely for a public
p'.lrpose, a county purpose and, therefore, not ultra
1blii
rires. The wisdom of the expenditure is obvious and
;1011·
for :ts such this court may not, nor could the trial court,
·for brand the expenditure as improper.
tior
hicr
ln Wood 'l'. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 510
Je11
(1962), a challenge was made to a legislative approfJriation to pay various claims made against the State.
One of the bases for challenge was the allegation that
the appropriation was for benefit of private persons
anrl. therefore, a gift of public monies and, hence, ultra
1ires the leuislative
authority.
This court observed:
c
•
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"In order to justify a conclusion that th
power to approve and pay such claims has been
taken away from the Legislature and placb]
exclusively within the control of the Board 01
Examiners, it would have to clearly so appear
which is not the case here.
"The Attorney General has also suggester]
that the appropriation to pay these claims mar
be outside the bounds of constitutional propriety as gifts of public funds to private indi·
viduals. It is an elementary principle of justict
that there should be 'equal rights to all and spe·
cial privileges to none.' And that thus there
should be no discrimination against nor favor·
itism toward some persons other others. It i1
quite unthinkable that the Legislature coulu
properly make gifts of public funds merely to
confer favors on certain individuals, or to ap·
pease self-seeking persons, who make preten<leo
but groundless claims agl(.inst the State. In order
to justify approval and payment there must oc
at least some semblance of a valid claim; or somr
relationship to the public interest or welfare, 011
the basis of which some responsibility on behn!i
of the State could properly rest."
The court also noted:
"We are obliged to apply the principle thal
legislative actions are endowed with a pres~1p
tion of validitv; and that thev will not be stricken
down unless it clearly app~ars that the Legis·
lature acted beyond its authority."
The court determined the issues adverse to the
claim of illegality.
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If it is remembered that the appellants in the
instant case acted in a legislative capacity, it seems
proper to conclude there was "some semblance of a
valid claim" for which the appropriation was made and
the ''presumption of validity" (a factor the ~rial court
did not mention) warrants upholding the expenditure.
Certainly it is so since the appropriation was made to
another public body. The appropriation alone, not the
distribution of the tickets or the other allegations (political in nature) as to wrongdoing, are before this
court. It must be borne in mind that the act questioned
was simply the purchase of the tickets, and not the
manner in which the tickets were invoiced and paid
for, nor the manner in which they were distributed
free of charge to people to develop an interest
in supporting the athletic program of Weber State
College. The question of legality then, as emphasized
above, becomes one of the use of county funds as a donation in support of a local college athletic program. The
appropriation was consequently legal.
Prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit, the Attorney General was asked to issue an opinion as to the
legality of the purchase of football tickets which now
is the subject of this appeal. That opinion, issued May
20, 1966, as Opinion No. 66-073, ruled that the expenditure was legal, and since that opinion was an independent determination by the State's Legal Officer,
rather than an argument by an advocate, a raither
extensiYe abstract from that opinion seems justified:
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"All the authorities are in agreement that t!.
appropriation of public funds for the prima 1
purpose of private gain is clearly an unlawfi:
expenditure. It is specifically provided in ti '
Utah Code that, whenever the county commi,
sion shall without authority of law order a1 .
money paid, for any purpose, the county attor
ney of such county shall institute suit in the na 111,
of the county against such officer and his bond,
man to recover the money. See Section 17-5-l~
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 76-28·nl
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, also provides:
'The making of profit out of public moot).
or using the same for any purpose not autho1 1
ized by la"), by any public officer, is a felon,1
and such officer, in addition to the punishmt11
provided by law, shall be disqualified to hoV
public office.'
The key to the issue presented in the purcha,
and distribution of the football tickets is whetlw
or not the expenditure would be considered .
'public purpose.'
The difficulty presented, of course, is: Wha
constitutes a 'public purpose'? Would the ex
penditure necessarily be illegal if individual
benefit from the expenditure? This problem lit
comes more difficult and his caused the cour!·
a considerable amount of trouble. Manv court
and authorities have held that an appr~priati 01
of public funds is not per se illegal simply br
cause private individuals benefited from the el
penditure. 42 Am. Jur. 756.
''¥here the appropriation of public. funii
or the creation of a public debt is pnmanl·
for public purposes, it is not necessaril~· fC!i
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<lered violative of constitutional prov1s1ons
against gifts and loans of public credit by an
incidental result which may be of private benefit, but if the result is chiefly that of private
benefit, an incidental or eyen ostensible public
purpose will not save its constitutionality.
156 A.L.R. 924.'

Bearing in mind the concept of 'public purpose,' it is necessary to relate the facts concerning the purchase of the football tickets to the
meaning of the phrase 'public purpose.'
The 'V eber County Commission in previous
years made contributions to the Weber College
Athletic Department. Certainly, a contribution
to a public institution that provides education to
the people of Weber County and stimulates
economic activity would not be disputed; there
is obviously sufficient 'public purpose' to justify such an expenditure. It is noted that the
general statutory provisions and opinions discussed in Part II would also allow an appropriation of public funds to a public educational
institution such as 'Veber State College; more
specifically, Section 17-5-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, authorizes the county commission
to provide for the safety, and preserve the
health, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace and good order of the county; Section 17-5-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended ( 1965), empowers the county commissioners to provide for the development of the
counties, manpower, industrial and other resources.
In 1965, the county commission advanced one
step further than it had done in the past; instead
of making an outright gift to the college, 50
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football tickets were received for the $600. 111
expenditure. If the county commission ha.,
merely filed the tickets away, it would, in effeet
be making an outright gift to the college as .•
had done in the past. It was the opinion of t!:
county commission, however, that a purchase au,:
distribution of football tickets would stimulat·.
more public interest in the college and prow(,,
be more valuable than a mere gift or donati 011
The distribution of the football tickets to citi
and county employees and other individuals ce;
tainly benefited private persons. The questiiJt•
presented, however, is whether or not the e1
penditure was primarily for a public purpo1·
with an incidental private benefit, or whetl:ti
it was primarily for a priYate purpose with a1
incidental public benefit.
The apparent intent of the county commiss!Ull
was to make a contribution to the college tl1a:
would have more value than a mere donation o
money. The purchase and distribution of tlit
tickets not only provided money for the atltletit
program, but also stimulated interest in thr
school; the result 'sould giYe a dual effect t
the action taken by the county commission.
1

A number of cases have held that the deter
mination of what constitutes a public purpo''
rests in the judgment or discretion of the l~giv
lative body, and the judiciary will not substitute
its judgment or discretion for that of the legi•
lative bodv unless that discretion is shom1 i·
have been. ~mquestionably abused. Gle11d1ile:
TfThite 67 Ariz. 231, 194 P.2d J.35 (IU~R·
Pipes , v. Hilderbrand, llO Cal. App. Zd Gl.i
243 P.2d 123 ( 1962); Slater v. Salt Lake Cit
115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 ( 194<9).
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The action taken by \he county comrruss1on
shoulcl be distinguished from a situation where
an appropriation is made with the intent to purchase football tickets for friends and associates
or to gain political favors; in this event~ private
gain would be the primary motivative factor.
To insure that the purchase and distribution
of the football tickets remains a 'public purpose,' precautions should be taken when the
tickets are distributed. Care must be exercised
to insure that the distributions are not limited
to particular groups, organizations, or political
parties.

If the foregoing precautions are practiced, it
must be concluded that the \Veber County Commission may authorize an expenditure of public
funds for the purchase of \Veber State College
foot baY tickets."
On June 24, 1965, the Utah Attorney General
issued Opinion No. 65-044, in which it was concluded
that both cities and counties could donate public funds
for culbral and entertainment purposes. The relatively
broad powers of cities and counties in this respect were
analyzed and summarized in that opinion:
"The basic question presented necessarily requires an examination of several subordinate
points. These considerations are summarized in
.J.2 Am. Jnr., p. 774, as follows:
'It is to be observed that the question of
the power of a county or municipality to lend
its aid to a prirnte enterprise conducted for
recreational entertainment purposes depends
upon a number of different considerations, in-
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eluding: (I) "\Vhether such enterprise can I
deemed 3: ':public purpose' within the gener,1,
rule restnctmg the expenditure of public fun 1],
to public purposes; ( 2) whether the legislatw1
has authorized the county or municipality
lend its aid to the enterprise in question;'
(3) whether the State Constitution contains
provision, as is the case in many states, forbirl·
ding local authorities to lend their aid to priYaJ;
enterprises.
·
For purposes of simplicity and organizatim1
the foregoing questions will be discussed in re·
verse order. The initial question, therefore, i i
the nature and extent of the prohibition con·[
tained in Article VI, Section 31, Constitutiorl
of Utah, which provides:
1

'The Legislature shall not authorize Int
State, or any county, city, town, townshii.'
district or other political subdivision of th1:
State to lend its credit or subscribe to stotl'
or bonds in aid of any railroad, telegraph nri
other private individual or corporate enter·:
prise or undertaking.'
The basic purpose of the above provision i·
to prevent any political subdivision with tilt:
State from using public funds to aid privalt;
persons or organizations engaged in busine~sr;!
for profit. It is clear that a variety of serwu;:
abuses would result if those in charge of tl11
public purse strings could utilize public ft~nJ,
to favor or aid private persons in their pecurnar:
pursuits. This is to be distinguished from legt,
timate uses of public funds or bonafide pt~bLil
purposes, even though there might be some 1~c:·
dental benefit to private commercial orgarnzn
tions, and is further to be distinguished fron:
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donations of funds to nonprofit organizations
which perform functions which legitimately could
be performed by political subdivisions.
'Vith respect to the use of public funds for
investment in privately-owned corporations for
profit, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
the constitutional provision above quoted is not
a blanket prohibition against such investments,
but is designed only to prevent use of public
funds when the primary purpose is to aid or
benefit the private commercial venture; but
when the Primary motive is to invest the public
funds in the public interest and for the benefit
of the public by providing a desirable return on
the investment, the constitutional provision is
not offended. Utah State Land Board v. Utah
State Finance C01nmi.Ysion, 12 P .2d 265, 365
P.2d 213.

\Vith respect to donating funds to nonprofit
corporations performing educational, entertainment and cultural functions, the general rule
is well established that constitutional provisions
similar to the provision above quoted do not
prohibit such donatoins and grants:
'Such donations are generally construed as
directed against benefits at public expense
attempted in behalf of individuals, corporations, or associations, as such, acting independently and conducting some enterprise of
their own as are usually conducted for profit
and are commercial in nature.' 38 Am. J ur.,
p. 94.
It is therefore concluded that there is no constitutional prohibition in Utah against counties
and municipalities donating public monies to
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organizations such as the Utah State Institu'
of Fine Arts and the Utah Civic Ballet Socieh
\Ve turn now to a consideration of the questj .i
as to whether the Legislature has authorizt'
municipalities and counties either to make ·
donations or to conduct activities comparaol ·
to those conducted by the institute and socie!i
1

'•

It is reasonably clear that municipalities car
provide educational, entertainmet and cultur,1
functions for the benefit of the inhabitants ri
the municipality. Section 10-8-2, Utah Coo
Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides, in parl
as follows :
:
1

I

'***

It shall be deemed a corporate puri
pose to appropriate money for any purpo•'
which in the judgment of the board of com
missioners or city council will provide for tl1~
safety, preserve the health, promote the pro•;
perity and improve the morals, peace, order!
comfort and convenience of the inhabitanl1
of the city.'
It is also reasonably clear that counties car
provide the services under consideration. Tt·
broad powers of counties granted by Sectto,r,
17-5-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amenu·
ed, would seem to provide ample authority im
such services and functions. Section 17·H~
Utah Codes Annotated, 1953, authorizes cou11
ties to levy a special tax for the purpose of rai'
ing revenue for exhibitions of produ~ts an:
industries of the county, for fairs and liveslol: 1
shows, and for comparable purposes, and spr
cifically provides that the counties can accoffi
plish this directly or 'though the instrumental;t:
of a corporation not for pecuniary profit, **
1

1
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It might also, be observed, with reference to the
broad powers of counties, that Section 17-4-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, grants to counties,
in addition to powers expressly granted, all other
powers as are necessarily implied to accomplish
the functions of county government; and Section
17-5-50 provides that counties 'may do and perform all other acts and things required by law
not in this title enumerated which may be necessary to the full discharge of the duties of the
board.'

More specifically, Section 11-2-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, authorizes counties to establish 'indoor recreation centers * * * or other
recreational facilities * * *' and Section 11-2-2
authorizes counties to organize and conduct
'plays, games, * * * dramatics, * * * festivals,
* * * community music * * * and other forms
of recreational activity, that may employ the
leisure time of the people in a constructive and
wholesome manner.' Sections 17-12-3, 4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, authorize
the issuance of bonds by counties for the construction of 'convention complex' facilities.
Having concluded that there is no constitutional prohibition against donation of public
funds to the entities under consideration, and
having further concluded that the Legislature
has granted sufficiently broad authority to cities
and counties to permit such entities to perform
services of the same nature as those under review,
we turn now to the question as to whether counties and cities can donate money to non-profit
entities as perform such services.
It is clear that public funds must be used
for public purposes. This does not mean that
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public funds must be appropriated only
public entities. It merely means that th~ t1
tities to which public funds are donated orai
. d must use t l1at money for legitu "!11
prop:iate
11
public purposes. The same rule applies e1t!
though the money donated or appropriated l'
been derived from taxation and ordinarily 11uull
not be available to private entities. 42 Am. Jw
pp. 756-60.
.
It might be observed that the Utah Leg~l:
ture has for a number of years a pproprial,
funds to private nonprofit corporations pr01:1.i
ing services which might legitimately have orii
performed by the State, but which, in fact, a·J'
being performed by private nonprofit agencit
For example, funds have been appropriated'!
the State Welfare Department for distribut:q
to children's aid societies, which are nonprot'
corporations deemed by the Legislature to i,1
performing legitimate public services. Chap!,[
175, Laws of Utah 1965, Section 13, Item~I

Since the Utah State Institute of Fine Ari
and the Utah Civic Ballet perform enterlar
ment and cultural services and functions. :
would be within the good faith determination 1;
the governing boards of cities or counties :
declare such services as public services, ano 1
make a reasonable donation of public fun.
to support such public purpose for the benr;
and the welfare of the inhabitants of the•·
spective political subdivisions.
The Opinion above quoted recognized that reas 11'1
able precautions and safeguards should be taken
assure that a general public purpose would be sefl:
within the boundaries of the political subdivision DI'
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iug the donation and to assure that the funds were

actually used for the purpose for which they were
donated:
Reasonable protections should be provided
for in making any such donation. The governing board of the county or municipality should
insure that the funds donated by it will be
utilized to aid in providing the service or function within the particular political subdivision.
In other words, Salt Lake City could not donate
funds to the Utah Civic Ballet for the purpose
of financing a ballet perfo)'mance in Iron County. This is to say that any city should insure that
the funds donated will be used exclusively to
promote performances within the city and any
county should insure that the funds donated by
it will be used to promote performances within
the county, thus insuring that the inhabitants
within the political subdivision from which the
monies are donated will be the beneficiaries of
the service or function provided.
It would also be advisable for a city or county
to provide that, in the event of dissolution or
liquidation of a nonprofit corporation which receives donated funds, any nonused funds donated by the city or county would revert to
the city or county, respectively. It could also be
provided that the city or county would receive
an accounting as to the method and manner
in which the donated funds were spent, and the
city or county should specifically provide for
the right to audit and verify any such accounting made as to the expenditure of donated funds.
It is further possible, in order to insure complete protection tothe officers of the municipal-
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ity or county authorizing the donation, to requti
that the donated funds be spent only upon 11
written approval of the city or county governui!
board for the. particul~r function proposed. t'I
other words, if a particular city were to malt
a donation of $10,000.00 to the Utah Ci11.I
Ballet, and the ballet society proposed to spefti:I
$2,000.00 of that sum to finance a performant!
within the particular city, the city commissw
could still require its approval in writing for!Ll1
expenditure of that part of the donation for tnr1
particular performance.
,:
1

It is therefore concluded that if the foregoin"I
determinations and protections are made ani.\
satisfied, cities and counties can make donation·
of public funds to either the Utah State Ins!!i
tute of Fine Arts or the Utah Civic Ballet S11I
ciety."

1

In the instant appeal there can be no question tb/
Weber State College serves a county-wide public pUJ·!
pose in its athletic program and activities. Located u1I
Ogden, Utah, the college serves the entire county irl
a number of ways, and while the primary and immedia!1;
benefit is that all persons within the county may fm!
entertainment purposes attend the athletic functioru:
and games, secondary county-wide benefits would nece1
sarily include the local pride in the quality and sur
cesses of the athletic teams (whether or not everyon:
actually attends the games as spectators), local bmi
ness generated through a larger and more active colleg11
program, and the county share of sales tax generat~1
·
sales , etc ., at the athlet1'c contests.
f rom conC ess10n
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From the authorities cited above, it must be concluded that 'Veber County can legally donate county
funds in support of any cultural, recreational or entertainment function sponsored by Weber State College,
so long as the function supported is reasonably available to the general public within the county.
lt is not denied that abuses and illegal conduct
could arise from the purchase of football tickets if fraud
or bad faith existed. If County Commissioners used
public funds simply to purchase season tickets for their
own personal use; or if county commissioners used
public funds to purchase a block of tickets which they
then sold and persona!ly kept the money; or if county
commissioners used public funds to purchase tickets for
distribution only to relatives, or to members of a particular political party, or to a specially selected group;
then, in all of such instances, the corrupt intent might
well result in civil and criminal liability.

However, the only conduct of the appellants that
was questioned by the lower court was the donation
' for the purchase of the tickets-no concern whatsoever
was expressed by the fact that the tickets were distributed free of charge to those performing unpaid
volunteer county services, and to others, but without
any favoritism based on race, creed, color, politics, or
other consideration. The pertinent observation is that
none of the Commissioners personally used any of the
tickets. Suffice to say that the court underscored the
fact that the Commissioners had "no dishonest motii·es" (Tr. 122).
37

It must be concluded that the determination oft
trial court that appellants' action was illegal mus!
reversed.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPO~:
ING THE STATUTORY PENALTY UNDE
17-5-13, UTAH COURT ANNOTATED, l9jo.

The appellants submit that if the approprial['
to Weber State College was illegal, a contention ap~i
lants reject, that the trial court committed error/
imposing the statutory penalty under 17-5-13, n!
Code Annotated, 1953. That section states:

"Any county commissioner who refuses'[
neglects to perform any duty imposed upon l
without just cause therefor or willfully violat·
any law provided for his government ass~
officer, or who, as commissioner, willfully, frat
ulently or corruptly attempts to perform an:
unauthorized by law shall, in addition to i'
penalty provided in the penal code, forfeit'
the county $500 for every such act, to be r
covered on his official bond, and shall be furt~
liable on his official bond to any person injun
thereby for all damages sustained"
As can be seen the penalty provision relates.
more than a simple mistake as to powers but requu
the person "willfully, fraudulently or corruptly'::
tempting to perform an unauthorized act or thew~
violation of law. This section, therefore, seems
contemplate the necessity of scienter and eril doil
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such as would give rise to a common law action for

1f 1

1s!

ilece1t. Such being the case the elements for liability
require a stronger finding to sustain the penalty that
the lower court made in this case. Prosser, Torts, 2nd
. Ed., p. 522.
I
I

The trial court expressly found "there was no
DE'! fraud nor criminal intent" (R. 23 etc.). The appellants,
)jQ. · according to the trial court, were "simply mistaken as
·ial[• to the law" (Tr. 122). There was no "evil motive"
ip~i (Tr. 122). The judgment made by appellants was an
ror I "honest mistake" if it was an erroneous judgment
I
rt.! (Tr. 122). The court dismissed the allegations of fraud
and intentional misdoing alleged in plaintiff's comi plaint (Tr. 123). Consequently, the court did not by its
;es 11
mb findings determine that there was the willful and coriolat:: rupt act necessary to invoke the penalty clause of 17 ss~I 5·13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

PO~:

1
:

frati

an:!
It is a general rule that county officials are not
tot'! liable for honest mistakes as to their powers, 20 C.J.S.,
fell'
ber!, Co1mties, Sec. 97, p. 884, and in the absence of bad
'urtif faith liability for illegal acts has of ten been withheld.
njunl State e.r. rel. Murphy v. Board of Commissioners of
Oidahoma County, 95 P.2d 101 (Oki. 1939). This is
ites • implicit if not express in the decisions of this court in
equ~ Salt Lake County v. Clinton, supra.; Bailey v. Van
ly" i, Dyke, supra.; and Carbon County v. Hamilton, 48
wtltt Utah 503, 160 Pac. 765 (1916). 17-5-12, Utah Code
ems Annotated, 1953, imposes liability for a wrongful paydoill. mentor appropriation of money.
However, 17-5-13,
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a separate penaltr P
• I
vision and appears to require a more intentional-a,
willful showing of wrongdoing. This statute shou]d:1
contrasted with the case where the statute grants::
additional recovery merely from the violation itst.
Avery v. Pima County, 7 Ariz. 26, 60 Pac. 702 (190~1
Such is not the case under the instant statute. It 1
quires a separate showing of wilfullness, or fraud, ,1
corruption not established in this case. Consequent]
allowing the penalty was improper.
The provisions of 17-5-13, Utah Code Annotatti
1953, are penalty provisions allowing for a civil k!
feiture on violation being established. Consequenil:I
the provisions should be narrowly construed, 23 ,.\L!
J ur., Forfeitures and Penalties, Sec. 37; ChriYtian.11!
v. Virginia Drilling Co., 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d ~"
( 1950). In the absence of clear expression of legi1!
tive intent to apply the forefeiture provisions ofi!
5-13 to instances of simple mistake as to powers
judgment this court should construe the statute
keeping with the strong and express requirements·
the statute and require a willful or evil intent, at le:,
a purposeful one to make an illegal expenditure. Sil
this was not show the court should, at least, reverse:_
imposition of the penalty.
Further, it should be noted that the Attori:,
General of the State of Utah was of the opinion ti.
the expenditure was lawful. Although this deter~
nation came after the fact it is not without significai
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detcrmmmg whether the penalty was properly imposed in this instance. In State v. Spring City, 123
Utah 471, 260 P.2d 527 (1953), this court held city
officials could properly rely upon the advice of the
Attorney General as to the legality of a bond issue,
and that such reliance would preclude liability. Certamly, where the State's Chief Executive Legal Officer
is of the opinion the action of appellants was proper,
thus confirming the fact that this case at best is one
un which legal minds may differ, it would be improper
to allow the penalty to remain in the absence of clearcut willful corruption. This court should reverse.

111

CONCLUSION

1

1
•

It is submitted that the trial court committed error
in concluding the appropriation made by appellants
was ultra-vires. The role of government is undergoing
change, and has changed substantially in the past
years. The public expects more in the way of services
from government, and if public officials are to render
meaningful service their power to exercise their authority and fulfill their obligations must not be curtailed
by overly rigid restrictions.
The expenditure in the instant case was clearly
for a public purpose. It most definitely was aimed
at helping an important institution in ,;veber County
and contributing to the industrial, educational and
recreational resources of the county. This was a legi-

41

timate end and, therefore, quite within the appelia
power. The determination of the trial court that 1
expenditure was illegal does not withstand proii
analysis in light of modern day reality. The role,'.
government in the development of local resources ai:
industry is ever increasing, Abbey, Municipal Ind0:
trial Development Bonds, 19 Vanderbilt Law Rent;;
25 ( 1965), and the need for such participation is su:;
stantial, Chamber of Commerce of the United Sla!t,
What New Industrial Jobs Mean to a Communi~
( 1963) . Only by a flexible a pp roach can true groin [
continue and the expense of government be adequa!tl
financed, Bridges, State and Local Inducement.1 h
Industry, 18 National Tax Journal 1,175 (1965). nf
judiciary must not, as this court has observed, intru~!
into the policies of the executive and the legislali"l
branches on any level unless the basis of the intern:!
tion is obvious, cf., Utah State Land Board v. Ull
State Finance Com'n., 12 Utah 2d 265, 365 P.2d i1
( 1961). When the instant facts are so analyzed i
apparent the lower court committed error. This cor
should reverse.
11

1
1

Respectfully submitted, '
RONALD N. BOYCE
c/o College of Law
University of Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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